The world’s agenda changes with bewildering speed. The conflict in Libya has receded in public consciousness, displaced by Syria and the killing of Osama bin Laden. This offers some relief to the leaders of Britain, France and the US, who initiated a western intervention that has won limited support from other Nato or Arab nations, and failed to trigger the swift eviction of Muammer Gaddafi.
But more decisions on Libya will soon be required. A 60-day review of the Nato mandate is due on 31 May, a 90-day review on 30 June. Officers are drafting options for their political masters, amid the yawning gap between military means and declared ends that has been apparent from the outset.
Planning is hampered by poor intelligence. Uncertainty persists about whether – as the British and French governments assert – Libya’s inland tribes are eagerly awaiting liberation from Colonel Gaddafi, or whether they retain a real loyalty to their erratic leader. Are the western nations bombing Libya in the cause of its national freedom, or merely in support of the weaker faction in a civil war – the coastal tribes of Cyrenaica? We do not know.
There are tensions between the US and European leaders. The Americans have never acknowledged a strategic interest in Libya’s future anything like as strong as that in Yemen, Syria and, of course, Pakistan and Iran. They were reluctant to open a new front when committed elsewhere, and remain nervous of protracted engagement.
Washington’s view, embracing the administration and military chiefs, is that if the Europeans wish to save the Libyans from their own ruler, a continent with an economy as large as that of the US should be able to pursue that objective with its own armed forces. The fact that only two of the large Nato European nations’ aircraft are engaged confirms every US prejudice about Europe’s military debility. While Norwegian and Danish aircraft are manfully achieving a higher hits-per-sortie ratio than the British and French, and the Belgians are also bombing, the Germans, Italians and Spanish are nowhere to be seen.
Under heavy pressure from David Cameron, the Americans are still providing resources to enforce the no-fly zone. But there is absolutely no appetite in Washington for extending this commitment, and a potential for real anger towards the British and French governments if the story ends in tears.
Military chiefs on both sides of the Atlantic acknowledged a moral imperative to act to halt the slaughter of innocents in Benghazi. But they remain baffled about why Barack Obama, Mr Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy chose to go much further, and declare an unequivocal commitment to regime-change. As military attrition and economic pressure weaken Col Gaddafi’s grip, there will be scope for a political deal and de facto partition. But air power alone is unlikely to enforce a decisive rebel victory. The threat or deployment of ground forces is an essential element of campaigns of this kind, yet there are neither the soldiers nor the political will for this.
I still believe Col Gaddafi will fall. My worry is Nato’s implicit acceptance of responsibility for what follows. Senior officers think at least a foreign stabilisation force will be indispensable to avert anarchy.
A veteran British statesman who supported intervention argues that Mr Cameron should have thrown himself into energetic personal diplomacy – and should still do so – to strengthen international backing. “There are times when only a prime minister can move nations to act,” he says. “Tony Blair knew that, and was very good at it.”
British and French ministers take a more sanguine view than do the Americans and some soldiers. They emphasise a dominant reality: the swift commitment of aircraft prevented a slaughter of innocent people. The west is thus on the right side of history in the Arab Spring.
It would be foolish to dismiss these arguments. If Libya emerges more or less happily from this struggle, Mr Cameron and Mr Sarkozy will deserve their laurels. Sceptics such as myself will have to recant. Meanwhile, Nato governments must review options. The most likely course is that bombing will continue for as long as it takes. It is anyone’s guess how long that will be. Britain’s chief of defence staff, General Sir David Richards, on Sunday called for a widening of the target list to include infrastructure, but it is by no means certain Nato partners will endorse this proposal.
A commitment of ground troops remains unlikely, though there might be a UN stabilisation force if or when Col Gaddafi goes. For Nato to arm the rebels would precipitate difficulties at the UN. The most attractive option diplomatically would be for Arab states to back the rebels. But this remains highly speculative, when they face so many problems closer to home.
Most even of those who opposed the Libyan entanglement would agree we must see this through to an acceptable conclusion. The honour and credibility of the west are now engaged here. The rebels cannot be abandoned to Tripoli’s revenge. This looks like a long story. Even if Col Gaddafi falls, for the west the hazards seem daunting.
By Max Hastings
Published: May 15 2011
The writer is an FT contributing editor
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